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Abstract
We revisit the effect of the “Eco-Patent Commons” (EcoPC) on the diffusion of patented
environmentally friendly technologies following its discontinuation in 2016, using both
participant survey and data analytic evidence. Established in January 2008 by several large
multinational companies, the not-for-profit initiative provided royalty-free access to 248
patents covering 94 “green” inventions. Hall and Helmers (2013) suggested that the patents
pledged to the commons had the potential to encourage the diffusion of valuable
environmentally friendly technologies. Our updated results now show that the commons did
not increase the diffusion of pledged inventions, and that the EcoPC suffered from several
structural and organizational issues. Our findings have implications for the effectiveness of
patent commons in enabling the diffusion of patented technologies more broadly.
Keywords: patent commons, patent pledge, green technology, eco-patent, diffusion,
climate change
JEL codes: Q55, O34, O13
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1. Introduction
Although patents give their owners the right to exclude others from practicing a patented
technology, or to charge them for the privilege of doing so, an increasing number of firms
across different industries have begun to make voluntary pledges intended to limit their
ability to enforce their patents to the fullest degree (Contreras, 2015). Yet the pledging of
patents, even to the extent that they will not be asserted against infringers, stops short of
abandoning or contributing them to the public domain.4 Thus, under a pledge model, also
referred to as patent commons, patent assets are retained by their owners, who continue to
incur maintenance and other fees, but the use of such patents for the traditional
exclusionary purpose is significantly curtailed.5
Patent commons differ from other mechanisms used to share patents, including crosslicensing agreements or patent pools in important ways. For example, in both crosslicensing agreements and patent pools, access to patents is granted only to participating
companies, although in the case of patent pools, outsiders often can also access the pooled
patents for a fee. The main difference between these structures and a patent commons,
therefore, is that the commons typically confers benefits on all third parties, regardless of
their contribution to the commons and typically without a formal contract.
Patent pledges are made for a variety of reasons, including the promotion of broad product
interoperability through common technical standards, the advocacy of new technology
platforms, and the pursuit of social goals (Contreras, 2015 and 2018). Over the past few
decades, significant patent pledges have been made in areas such as open source software
(e.g., IBM, Sun, Google and Red Hat have each pledged that they will not assert hundreds of
patents against open source software implementations), electric vehicles (Tesla Motors’
famous proclamation that “All our patents are belong to you”(sic)), and biotechnology (e.g.,
Monsanto’s pledge not to assert patents covering genetically modified seeds against
farmers inadvertently growing them) (see, generally, Contreras, 2015 and 2018). Over the
years, some collective patent pledges, pledge communities and patent commons have
achieved significant adoption in the marketplace, while others have not. For example, from
its inception in 2014 through late 2017, Google’s License on Transfer (LOT) network, in
which patent holders commit not to transfer their patents to patent assertion entities
(PAEs), attracted 180 members and more than 180,000 patents (LOT 2018). In contrast,
Several large patent holders, including IBM, have a well-articulated strategy for abandoning unused patents
(Crouch, 2012). Other coordinated industry efforts, particularly in the biomedical sector, have contributed
substantial intellectual property assets to the public domain for a variety of reasons (Contreras, 2014).
4

Patent pledges, including the Eco-Patent Commons, usually contain so-called “defensive suspension”
provisions that allow pledging companies to deny royalty-free access to other companies that assert their
patents against the pledging firm. By itself, this phenomenon suggests that some patents are held for purely
defensive purposes rather than as exclusionary rights.
5
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the Defensive Patent License (DPL) network, which was launched in the same year with
similar goals, has attracted few members (Contreras 2018). The differences in take-up
between these two pledge communities can be attributed to a variety of factors including
internal governance mechanisms, commitment details and evangelization (Contreras 2018)
The Eco-Patent Commons (EcoPC) was an innovative not-for-profit initiative undertaken
by a small group of large industrial firms with the goal of pledging “green technology”
patents for broad, royalty-free use in addressing environmental challenges. The thirteen
EcoPC participants collectively pledged a total of 248 “green technology” patents (94
priority patents or distinct inventions) to the EcoPC between its formation in 2008 and its
discontinuation in 2016.6
The EcoPC had the ambitious objective of promoting the diffusion of green technologies to
increase and accelerate their adoption and to encourage follow-on innovation. The
theoretical mechanism to achieve all this is simple: by removing a patent owner’s ability to
assert a patent against any users of the patented technology, the technology -- which had
been already disclosed by the patent publication -- becomes available for royalty-free use
to any interested party. In principle, this addresses the well-known welfare cost associated
with temporary market power granted by patents that likely slows the diffusion of
patented technology (Hall and Helmers, 2010).
Following its creation, the EcoPC attracted substantial attention in both the scholarly
literature (Mattioli, 2012; Hall and Helmers, 2013; Awad, 2015; Contreras, 2015) and the
popular media (Tripsas, 2009). In addition to accolades, the EcoPC attracted some
skepticism regarding its potential effectiveness. The skepticism focused on whether a
commons could offer sufficient incentives to attract valuable patent pledges and thereby
achieve its ambitious goals. In contrast to other mechanisms designed to share patents,
such as cross-licensing and patent pools, patent owners in the EcoPC committed to
maintain ownership of their patents (which is costly) while making those patents freely
accessible to third parties including competitors. Some competitive safeguards were left in
place, notably a defensive termination right in case a different patent was asserted against
the pledger by another firm using the patented technology. For these reasons, it was not
obvious what benefits the commons offered to participants beyond reputational
enhancement. This in turn meant that participants could have had incentives to minimize
their costs by pledging only patents with little commercial value and allowing them to lapse
shortly after they were pledged. A second possible benefit might be that those building on

Patents are territorial rights, that is, separate patents on the same invention have to be obtained in each
jurisdiction where patent protection is sought. This means that there often exist multiple patents on the same
invention, which are referred to as equivalents or patent family. The priority patent describes the first patent
filing within a given set of equivalents.
6
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these technologies might find other (commercial) outputs of the contributing firm useful,
or might add to a knowledge base from which the firm would benefit.7
In an earlier study (Hall and Helmers 2013), we studied the characteristics of the patents
pledged to the EcoPC. This study confirmed that the pledged patents did claim
environmentally friendly technologies. Moreover, pledged patents were of similar value to
other patents in the pledging firm’s portfolio, but of lower value than other patents in their
class, using the usual patent value indicators (based on citations, family size, number of
patent technology classes, etc.). The findings suggested that the EcoPC participants might
have pledged patents with the potential to diffuse environmentally friendly technologies
that were possibly useful to other firms and researchers.
To study whether the EcoPC increased the diffusion of green technologies, Hall and
Helmers (2013) looked for changes in forward citations to pledged patents following their
addition to the commons. They constructed a set of control patents that matched the
publication authorities, priority years, and technology classes of the EcoPC patents. They
examined the pattern of citations by subsequent patent applications to the set of EcoPC
patents and their controls over time, before and after contribution and found that the
EcoPC patents tended to be cited less than the patents in the control group before
contribution to the EcoPC. However, the results after contribution were inconclusive,
because most of the patents were contributed in late 2008 and there was little data postpledge as citation data was available only through early 2012, leaving little more than 3
years of citation data post-pledge.
In the current study, we revisit the effect of the EcoPC on technology diffusion and assess
its impact more broadly, using several approaches. The first is a set of interviews with
participants in the EcoPC and those responsible for it, described in Section 3 of this paper.
These interviews provide helpful qualitative information that allows us to better
understand the underlying causes of the EcoPC’s failure to encourage diffusion of pledged
technologies. The second is an updated look at the data on the patents pledged to the
EcoPC, described mainly in sections 4 and 5. With the passage of time, substantially more
citation data has become available (through 2016 as opposed to early 2012 in Hall and
Helmers (2013)). This allows us to reexamine the data and provide a more definitive
answer to the question whether the commons has had any effect on technology diffusion, at
least as reflected in subsequent patenting. The fact that the EcoPC was discontinued in
2016 while during the same time several new commons were created also motivates us to
revisit the viability of such patent commons more generally. Finally, we asked inventors of

Belenzon (2006) shows that focal firm citations to patents that cite a focal firm’s patents are positively
valued by the market, suggesting this kind of feedback effect from others’ use of the firm’s technology.
7
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the patents that cite any of the EcoPC patents after they were pledged about the role that
the pledge has played in their decision to rely on an EcoPC patent as prior art.
To summarize our main findings: we do not find any evidence that the EcoPC increased the
diffusion of pledged patents. Pledged patents are cited less than the matched control
patents before they enter the commons, suggesting that they were already less valuable,
and their pledge does not change this. Inventors of citing patents unanimously indicated
that the pledge, i.e. royalty-free access, did not affect their decision to rely on an EcoPC
patent as prior art. In fact, none of the inventors that responded to our query were even
aware that the cited patent was part of the EcoPC and hence royalty-free access played no
role in their decision to rely on it as prior art. These results suggest that the commons had
no effect on technology diffusion. Looking at the EcoPC priority patents, 82 per cent had
lapsed by July 2017 due to expiration (26 per cent), rejection or withdrawal (18 per cent),
or non-payment of renewal fees (38 per cent). This indicates that participating companies
in most cases did not consider the benefits of the commons sufficiently large to maintain
the patents in force and expired patents were not replaced by new patent pledges. Our
interviews with representatives of the EcoPC participants reveal several common critiques
of the EcoPC’s structure and operational processes that help explain our quantitative
findings, particularly EcoPC’s inability to provide information regarding the usage of
contributed technologies.8 Another major impediment to diffusion was the lack of
information provided by pledging companies beyond the patent documents that could have
helped potential users (especially in developing countries) see potential applications of the
pledged technologies. Finally, no concerted effort was made to group or link patents in the
commons to any particular technology. This lack of coordination may have limited
synergies that could have been created through a more deliberate approach to the
technologies covered by contributed patents.
This study both updates our previous work and fills gaps in our understanding of the
functioning and performance of the EcoPC and patent commons more generally. Providing
a more definitive answer to the question of diffusion and the functioning of the EcoPC more
broadly is important for several reasons. First, it offers insight regarding the manner in
which patent pledges can support the diffusion and implementation of (green) technologies
around the world. Second, it can inform the design of other pledge communities both in the
environmental space and other key technology areas, such as electric vehicles, software,
biotechnology, and agriculture. Third, it informs us more generally about the viability of
patent commons created by for-profit companies as a mechanism to share access to
patented technology

This feature of the commons also limits our ability to study their subsequent use, which is why we chose to
focus on citations to these patents, which is public data.
8
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The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the institutional
design and history of the EcoPC. Section 3 summarizes the findings from our interviews of
participants in the EcoPC. In Sections 4 and 5 we turn to a quantitative analysis of these
patents and their citations and discuss the results of our inventor survey. Section 6 offers a
few concluding thoughts that emerge from our analysis for the design and functioning of
patent commons.

2. The Eco-Patent Commons: Structure and Development9
The concept for the EcoPC as a collective mechanism for permitting broad usage of patents
covering environmental technologies was originally developed by IBM in the mid-2000s as
one of several corporate initiatives directed toward environmental protection and
sustainability (IBM 2010). Given IBM’s well-known patent strength,10 a program to
promote environmental causes would capitalize on one of the company’s principal assets.
IBM had already made significant commitments to the sharing of patents and other
intellectual property (IP) in the area of open source code software (Merges 2004; Wen et al.
2013; Contreras 2015). Accordingly, extending these initiatives to the environmental area
was consistent with IBM’s existing corporate culture.11
The idea behind the EcoPC is that industrial firms with large patent portfolios likely hold
patents covering technologies with environmental applications, but because those
technologies are not core to the firm’s business, they are languishing unused. If, however,
the patents covering these technologies could be made freely available to users around the
world, then a significant public service could be rendered at a minimal cost to the patent
holder.
IBM publicly announced the concept for the EcoPC at its Global Innovation Outlook
conference in 2006 (IBM 2008). It then initiated discussions with other large firms with
which it had existing business ties and which it believed might be sympathetic to a
collective approach to making environmental technologies more broadly available. In
January 2008, IBM announced the launch of the EcoPC together with Nokia, Pitney Bowes
The material in this section is derived both from the works cited and also from the interviews described in
Part 3, below. Additional information regarding the organization and history of the EcoPC can be found in
Mattioli (2012), Hall and Helmers (2013) and Awad (2015).
9

According to U.S. Patent and Trademark Office statistics, IBM regularly receives more U.S. patent grants
than any other company in the world, about 7,000-8,000 patents per year in 2014-2016.
10

11

The EcoPC explicitly compared itself to the open source movement, noting in its promotional materials “As
has been demonstrated by the open source software community, the free sharing of knowledge can provide a
fertile ground for new collaboration and innovation. Sharing environmental patents can help others become
more eco-efficient and operate in a more environmentally sustainable manner—enabling technology
innovation to meet social innovation.” (EcoPC 2017).

6
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and Sony (IBM 2008). A total of thirteen firms eventually joined the EcoPC as summarized
in Table 1, below.
Table 1: Firm Participation in the EcoPC
Firm
IBM
Nokia
Pitney Bowes
Sony
Bosch
DuPont‡
Xerox
Taisei
Ricoh
Dow
Fuji Xerox
Hewlett-Packard
Hitachi‡

Date Joining EcoPC
Jan. 14, 2008
Jan. 14, 2008
Jan. 14, 2008
Jan. 14, 2008
Sept. 8, 2008
Sept. 8, 2008
Sept. 8, 2008
Mar. 23,2009
Mar. 23, 2009
Oct. 20, 2009
Oct. 20, 2009
July 1, 2010
July 25, 2011

No. Patents Pledged*
29
1
2
4
24
11
13
2
1
1
2
3
1

* Priority patents (i.e. patent families).
‡ DuPont and Hitachi withdrew from the EcoPC in 2013, as of the transfer of
management from WBCSD to ELI.

The stated mission of EcoPC was “to manage a collection of patents pledged for
unencumbered use by companies and IP rights holders around the world to make it easier
and faster to innovate and implement industrial processes that improve and protect the
global environment.” (EcoPC, 2013b). Accordingly, patents eligible for inclusion in the
EcoPC were required to belong to one of sixty enumerated International Patent
Classification (IPC) codes12 relating to environmental or sustainability technology.
Technologies sought by the EcoPC included energy conservation, pollution control,
environmentally-friendly materials, water or materials use or reduction, and recyclability
(EcoPC, 2013b). 248 patents were pledged to the EcoPC, with the last such contribution
occurring in 2011 (see Part 4 below).13
To pledge a patent to the EcoPC, the owner was required to make an irrevocable covenant
not to assert the patent – or “any worldwide counterparts” (EcoPC, 2013a) -- against any
infringing machine, manufacture process or composition of matter that
“reduces/eliminates natural resource consumption, reduces/eliminates waste generation
or pollution, or otherwise provides environmental benefit(s).” (EcoPC, 2013a). This being
12

The IPC system divides technologies into eight principal sections with approximately 70,000 subcategories.

This number is arrived at as follows: there were 238 patents pledged at the time of our work in Hall and
Helmers (2013). Since then, Hewlett-Packard added 9 and Hitachi 1, for a total of 248.
13
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said, patent owners retained the (defensive termination) right to assert pledged patents
against (a) any EcoPC participant that asserted any environmental patent against them, or
(b) any non-EcoPC participant that asserted any patent against them (EcoPC, 2013a).14
The initial administrator of the EcoPC was the World Business Council for Sustainable
Development (WBCSD), a Geneva-based non-governmental organization focused on
environmental and sustainability issues. WBCSD’s initial duties consisted primarily of
hosting the EcoPC web site and promoting EcoPC to other WBCSD members for purposes of
recruitment. WBCSD publicized the EcoPC among its members and attracted several of the
participants that joined following the EcoPC’s formation (see Table 1).
Participation in the EcoPC was open to all individuals and companies in the world, the only
requirement for participation being the pledging of one or more patents according to the
EcoPC’s rules.15 Neither membership in WBCSD nor any additional dues or charges were
required for EcoPC participation. The EcoPC itself was characterized as an unincorporated,
non-profit association (EcoPC, 2013b).
In 2013, the administration of EcoPC was transferred from WBCSD to the Environmental
Law Institute (ELI), a Washington, D.C.-based trade and advocacy organization. This
transition was apparently orchestrated by IBM, which had withdrawn as a member of
WBCSD, thereby eliminating the primary driver of WBCSD’s involvement. ELI, of which IBM
was a significant member, hosted the EcoPC web site from 2013 through 2016, but was not
actively engaged in recruiting new participants. Two EcoPC members, Hitachi and DuPont,
withdrew from the EcoPC at the time of this administrative shift. No new patents were
contributed to the EcoPC after Hitachi’s initial 2011 contribution. By 2016, very little
activity was occurring at the EcoPC. Accordingly, in 2016, the EcoPC was formally
discontinued (EcoPC, 2016).16
Though the EcoPC has been shut down, pursuant to the EcoPC Ground Rules and pledge
terms, the “irrevocable” non-assertion pledge made with respect to each pledged patent
will continue in accordance with its terms indefinitely.17

14

This is a so-called “defensive termination” provision.

Members of the EcoPC were required to complete a Membership Application/Pledge Form which bound
them to comply with the EcoPC’s Non-Assert Pledge, Ground Rules and Governance Structure (EcoPC, 2013a).
15

Based on our interviews (see Part 3 below), we understand that each EcoPC participant was consulted by
IBM regarding the decision to wind-down the EcoPC. Apparently there was no resistance to this course of
action.
16

The Ground Rules make it clear that a patent owner’s EcoPC pledge will survive that owner’s withdrawal
from the EcoPC (EcoPC 2013a (“voluntary or involuntary withdrawal shall not affect the non-assert as to any
approved pledged patent(s) – the non-assert survives and remains in force”). For example, Hitachi pledged a
17

8

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3313407

3. Interviews
This section of the paper describes the results of a series of semi-structured interviews
with representatives of participating companies, WBCSD and ELI.18 Here we focus on the
strengths and weaknesses of the EcoPC that were identified by interviewees with a view to
informing our interpretation of our quantitative results on the diffusion of pledged
technologies. Additional findings from our interviews are summarized in Contreras et al.
(2018).

3.1

Methodology

We identified individuals employed by EcoPC corporate participants who had been
personally involved with their employer’s decision to join the EcoPC and/or its ongoing
participation in the EcoPC. Through online searches and informal inquiries we were able to
obtain valid and current contact details for representatives of nine of the thirteen EcoPC
corporate participants. Seven of these individuals consented to be interviewed for this
study (five by telephone and two by written correspondence).19 In addition, we
interviewed representatives of WBCSD and ELI who were directly involved in EcoPC
activities.20
The information gathered in this way is not necessarily representative of the views held by
all member companies of the EcoPC as there is the possibility that interviewees selected
into our sample based on their own, subjective views of the performance of the EcoPC. That
said, we obtained information from a relatively diverse sampling of company
representatives (relative to the number of people involved in the project) across different
geographical regions (companies based in the U.S., Europe and Japan) and are therefore
optimistic that these interviews offer relevant information with regard to at least a
significant portion of the EcoPC participants’ views regarding the organization.

patent to the EcoPC in 2011, but withdrew from the EcoPC in 2013. This patent should remain pledged. See
Contreras (2015: 598).
Interviews were conducted by Contreras pursuant to a determination of “no human subject research” by
the University of Utah Institutional Review Board (Jun. 26, 2017, IRB 00102447). Interview subject
information is held by Contreras.
18

The authors have agreed not to disclose the identities of either the individuals interviewed or the EcoPC
participant companies that they represented, with the exception of IBM, given its central role in forming and
managing the EcoPC.
19

Interview scripts differed for individuals representing EcoPC participants versus administrators. Each
interview lasted approximately thirty to sixty minutes. Responses were coded by the interviewer. No
compensation was offered to interview subjects.
20
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3.2

Findings

Most respondents viewed the EcoPC as a valuable demonstration of corporate willingness
to collaborate to achieve environmental and sustainability goals. The public relations
benefits of EcoPC participation were also viewed as valuable by some companies. However,
each of the respondents expressed dissatisfaction with at least some aspects of the EcoPC
which help explain its failure to encourage the diffusion of the pledged technologies and
ultimately the EcoPC’s shutdown:
a.
Membership and Recruitment. At its height in 2011, the EcoPC had thirteen
corporate participants. Though these firms were all major global enterprises with large
patent portfolios, they still represented only a tiny fraction of the total potential
membership in the organization. Particularly given that the EcoPC charged no membership
fee, it was somewhat puzzling that so few firms joined. While WBCSD did appear to
promote membership in the EcoPC, few of WBCSD’s many members elected to join. Based
on our discussions with EcoPC members, we believe that possible impediments to
recruitment were (a) the perceived difficulty and expense of identifying suitable patents
for contribution, (b) a belief among potential members that they lacked patents that were
suitable for contribution, and (c) an aversion to the idea of contributing potentially
valuable patents to the EcoPC without compensation, a view generally held by legal and IP
departments.
b.
No Tracking of Usage. All respondents observed that there was no effective way to
determine whether the technologies covered by patents pledged to the EcoPC had been
utilized.21 As a result, it was difficult for them to draw conclusions regarding whether the
EcoPC was worth the effort, and to determine whether the goals of improving
environmental conditions and sustainability were being met. Moreover, without clear
success metrics, it was difficult to justify devoting ongoing effort to the EcoPC to upper
management at some companies. Several respondents indicated that the EcoPC made a
conscious decision not to require users to register with the web site or report back to the
EcoPC, as it was felt that such requirements would serve as barriers to use of the web site.
WBCSD, at least initially, tracked hits to the EcoPC web site and shared this information
with the participants.22 However, as noted above, identifying information about visitors
was not collected, and it was not clear whether visitors were academics, students,
attorneys, journalists or potential users of technology.

21

This weakness was identified by commentators soon after the EcoPC’s formation (Bowman, 2009).

We analyzed the data on web hits in our earlier study to find a highly skewed distribution of hits, only 36
patents received any hits. Nevertheless, the analysis also indicated a positive correlation between web hits
and forward citations by other patents (Hall and Helmers, 2013).
22
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c.
Website not User-Friendly. It was noted that the cataloging of patents on the EcoPC
web site, which was organized by contributing company rather than technology area, was
not particularly intuitive or informative. It required potential users to look up the relevant
patents one by one in order to understand the technology being offered. Moreover, usually
only a single patent family member was listed, requiring users to identify the remaining
members themselves. This procedure would have required both substantial effort on the
part of potential users, as well as a high degree of familiarity with the format and
terminology of patent documents.23 As documented by Hall and Helmers (2013), the
website also listed a number of erroneous patent numbers, another potential source of
frustration for users.
d.
No Technology Transfer. Another issue raised by several respondents was that the
EcoPC sought to promote the dissemination of green technologies through patents alone.
Yet complex technologies often cannot be understood and implemented, especially by nonexperts working in the developing world, only through patent disclosures (McManis and
Contreras 2014). Some form of technology assistance or transfer is generally required to
enable local users to take advantage of patented technologies, or even to realize that such
technologies are available and applicable to local problems. One of the issues that emerged
in this regard was uncertainty regarding the intended users of the EcoPC system.
Several of the individuals we interviewed believed that intended users of EcoPC technology
would be from the developing world. Yet this belief evidences a misunderstanding of the
global patent system. Patents prevent usage of a patented technology only in the countries
where patents are issued. Most companies do not seek patent protection in the leastdeveloped countries, either because protection is uncertain in those countries, or because
their markets are underdeveloped and the cost of procuring patent protection is not
viewed as cost effective. Even in middle income countries, multinationals tend to focus on
pharmaceutical patenting and patenting in specific areas where the country in question is
competitive (Hall and Helmers 2018; Abud et al. 2013). Accordingly, many technologies
that are patented in the developed world are not themselves patented in the developing
world. This general rule certainly applies to the patents contributed to the EcoPC, most of
which have “family” members throughout the developed world (North America, Europe,
Asia Pacific – see Table 4 below), but few if any patent family members in the developing
world. Thus, organizations in the developing world already have the right to seek to exploit
many technologies disclosed in patents filed in the developed world. But they do not do so
because, as discussed above, the utilization of even moderately complex technologies is not
possible without significant training and technology transfer activity that is not
It is worth pointing out that this situation is changing rapidly at the present time, since Google patent
search now includes the members of the patent family in its results. However, this feature was not available
during most of the life of the EcoPC.
23
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accomplished through the grant of patent rights alone. In addition, technologies patented in
the developed world may not be targeted to needs in the developing world without
extensive further development.

4. Data
For the purpose of our quantitative analysis in Section 5 below, we updated the database
used in Hall and Helmers (2013). This means that for comparison purposes, we restricted
the set of patents to all patents pledged prior to July 2010, which excludes the 4 families
pledged by Hewlett-Packard and Hitachi.24 We also included the original control patents,
which had been obtained by propensity score matching on priority year, IPC subclass, and
publication authority.
Updating the data turned out to be somewhat complex, partly because the original data
were drawn from a PATSTAT version with non-permanent identifiers, and partly because
PATSTAT itself changes over time, with some data disappearing due to changes in the data
at the contributing national or regional patent offices. In addition, the list of patents on the
EcoPC website appears to have changed slightly, to some extent in response to our
comments on the original list (incorrect numbers, etc.). We used the April 2017 PATSTAT
version and identified a correspondence between the prior identifying numbers and the
permanent (as of April 2011) identifiers using information on the application number and
authority of the relevant patents. In a few cases, we were unable to find the application
number-authority combination on the new version of PATSTAT. There were 4 such
applications from the Japanese Patent Office (JPO), which apparently had been withdrawn
and are no longer on their website.25 We included them in our forward citation analysis as
having zero cites, for completeness. In addition, 24 applications from the Australian Patent
Office (APO) were reduced to 12 applications in the new PATSTAT file. Most of these
problems affected the control patents rather than the Eco-patents.
The resulting dataset contains 698 applications rather than the original 711, with the
distribution shown in Table 2.

In the case of the Hitachi patent, it is not clear that the patent was ever listed on EcoPC’s public web site. All
versions of the EcoPC list of patents that we were able to locate using web archive tools were current only as
of May 2011, prior to Hitachi’s joining.
24

One problem with searching for JPO patents, especially the earlier ones, is that the numbering systems are
quite
complex
and
some
numbers
are
apparently
reused
occasionally
(See
http://www.searchpriorart.com/search_tips/patent_no_search.htm for further information on Japanese
patent numbering). This problem leads to apparent errors on the Espacenet and Google patents websites. We
also found that at least two of the equivalent patents we had identified for the controls became utility model
patents when they were granted in Japan.
25
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Table 2: Dataset construction

Number of applications
Controls
Eco-patents
Num of equivalence groups
Controls
Eco-patents
Number of citations
Controls
Eco-patents

Old (2011 data) New (2017 data)
711
698
473
461
238
237
184
184
94
94
90
90
1872
4056
1205
2713
667
1343

Note: Controls matched based on the publication authorities, priority years,
and IPC classes of the EcoPC patents.

From Table 2, one can see that although the set of applications has changed slightly, we still
have the same number of equivalent groups for the patents to be analyzed. It is also clear
that the number of citations to both the EcoPC patents and controls has grown
considerably, more than doubling in both cases (see Section 5.2 below for further analysis
of the citations).
For our inventor survey, we extracted from PATSTAT the names of all inventors of all 329
patents that cited an EcoPC patent after the patent had been pledged to the commons. We
then focus only on those patents where the citation to the EcoPC patent was not added by
the examiner (see also Section 5.2). This left us with 141 patents (43 per cent). After
undertaking some name cleaning and harmonization, we obtained a total of 271 inventors.
We then searched the web for their contact information. We were able to send our short
questionnaire, which consisted of only three questions, to 71 (26 per cent) inventors. We
obtained responses from 13 inventors, a response rate of 18 per cent. However, only 10 of
these 13 inventors agreed to answer our questionnaire. These 10 inventors worked for
four different EcoPC member companies: three inventors worked for Bosch, three for IBM,
three for DuPont and one for Xerox. These are the four firms that contributed the largest
number of patents to the commons (Table 2). We summarize the results briefly in section
5.2 below.

5. Empirical results
In this section, we use the data on patents pledged to the EcoPC and their matched controls
to analyze (1) the legal status of EcoPC patents to gauge whether member companies
considered continued ownership of their pledged patents as sufficiently important to incur
13

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3313407

the associated costs and (2) the diffusion of the technologies protected by patents pledged
to the EcoPC as measured by citations received from other patents.

5. 1 Legal status of the pledged patents
We begin by looking at the legal status of the EcoPC pledged patents as of July 2017,
summarized in Table 3. We collected these data from PATSTAT’s legal status tables of April
2017 and supplemented the information using web searches. The WO (PCT) patents in our
database will not have a post-grant legal status since they are granted on a national basis,
and a few patent applications from the JPO could not be found, probably because the
PATSTAT entries were for translations or they were utility model applications in Japan,
even though they might have been patent applications elsewhere. There are 15 such
patents for which we do not have legal status, or legal status is meaningless. Of the
remaining 221 patent applications, almost 20 percent of the 90 priority patents were still
in force as of July 2017, but only 11 percent of all the equivalent patents. Of the 27 patents
still in force or pending, 12 are US patents, 6 are Japanese, 4 are European Patent Office
(EPO) or German, and the remainder are Chinese (1), Russian (2), Mexican (1), and Korean
(1). Almost half the patents have expired for nonpayment of fees, although almost as many
expired at the end of their terms.
Table 3

Legal status of eco-patents - July 2017
All
8
19
27
90
61
18
24
193
5
11
236

pending
granted and in force
Total still active
nonpayment of fees
expired at term
rejected
withdrawn
Total not active
Missing (from JPO)*
WO applications
Total

Priority
3
14
17
29
30
7
7
73
0
0
90

All
3.4%
8.1%
11.4%
38.1%
25.8%
7.6%
10.2%
81.8%
2.1%
4.7%

Priority
3.3%
15.6%
18.9%
32.2%
33.3%
7.8%
7.8%
81.1%
0.0%
0.0%

* These appear to be translation entries or utility models.
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In Figure 1, we show the distribution of patent lifetimes (approximated by the lapse
(expiration or nonpayment) dates minus the application filing date).26 In the case of
patents still in force, we measured the lifetime to July 2017. The distribution is fairly flat for
those patents that did not remain in force for their full terms. A substantial number of
patents remained in force for either the full 20-year patent term or a significant portion of
it. This suggests that in many cases, companies decided to pay renewal fees to keep the
patents in force even after they had been pledged to the EcoPC.27 For example JP4696713
“Wastewater treatment process” by Fuji Xerox is still in force in 4 out of 5 jurisdictions in
which it was filed. Other patents still in force include Sony’s JP3876497 “Flocculating agent
and a method for flocculation” which was granted in early 2007 or IBM’s US6294028
“Mercury process gold ballbond removal apparatus” which was granted in 2001 and
maintained in force throughout the entire lifetime of the EcoPC. However, there are also
patents such as US5050676 “Apparatus for two phase vacuum extraction of soil
contaminants” owned by Xerox; the patent has 5 equivalents, 4 of which had expired before
the patent was pledged, and the remaining patent expired at term less than a year and a
half after the patent was pledged and no maintenance fees were payable during that time.
This is an example of the pledge of a patent that had most likely no longer any value to the
company.

Most offices now have a common patent term: 20 years from filing date, but there are various exceptions,
and older patents in our sample may have been issued under different rules. When we were able to obtain the
actual expiration date, we used that (most cases).
26

Renewal fees usually increase over time, at the USPTO for example, large entities pay US$1,600 to maintain
a patent inforce after 4 years after grant and US$7,400 12 years after grant.
27
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Figure 1
Patent lifetime distribution for eco-patents
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Figure 2 breaks down the different reasons why patents lapsed. It shows that a significant
number of patents have expired since 2007, the year before the EcoPC was launched. A few
patents were rejected by the relevant patent offices or were withdrawn by applicants, but
the majority lapsed due to non-payment of renewal fees.
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Figure 2

Table 4 shows the geographic coverage of the EcoPC patents. 90 percent of the priority
patent applications were made to the 4 most important jurisdictions: the US, Germany,
Japan, and the EPO, and these jurisdictions account for 80 percent of the patents overall.
There is very little evidence that the patents in the commons ever covered less-developed
countries. The only patents in middle income countries are in Brazil (7), Mexico (4), and
Argentina (1), and there are none in low income countries. So patents cannot have been an
obstacle to the use of technologies in less-developed countries.
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Table 4: Application authority distribution

Application authority distribution
Authority
USA
Germany
Japan
EPO
South Korea
China
Austria
Spain
UK
Norway
Denmark
Brazil
Canada
Mexico
Australia
Russia
Argentina
France
Hong Kong
Israel
Total

Priorities
34
20
17
10
2
2
1
1
1
1
1

US
DE
JP
EP
KR
CN
AT
ES
GB
NO
DK
BR
CA
MX
AU
RU
AR
FR
HK
IL

90

All
75
45
34
34
7
3
4
4
2
2
1
7
7
4
2
2
1
1
1
1
237

5.2 Technology diffusion and follow-on innovation
Next we reexamine the question of technology diffusion by looking at the updated citation
data. Our analysis in Hall and Helmers (2013) suggested that pledged patents protect
environmentally friendly technologies that could have the potential to be adopted for use
by third parties. To analyze any effect on diffusion, we adopt a difference-in-differences
estimation, comparing the number of forward citations received by patents pledged to the
EcoPC before and after they were pledged to citations received by the set of matched
control patents that were not pledged to the EcoPC. Our estimation approach allows for
different citation patterns between the set of EcoPC and control patents before the EcoPC
patents were pledged. This accounts for concerns that pre-pledge citation behavior could
be correlated with the decision to pledge a given patent to the EcoPC.

18

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3313407

Table 5 shows a comparison of standard patent characteristics between the set of patents
pledged to the EcoPC and the matched (by priority year, IPC subclass, and publication
authority) control patents where we focus on the priority patents (Table A-1 in the
appendix shows the data for all equivalents). There are no statistically significant
differences between the grant lag, the number of backward or non-patent literature
references between the two sets of patents. Interestingly, EcoPC patents are more likely to
be pursued until grant. However, control patents have a larger family size and a larger
number of claims both of which are commonly used patent value indicators. This suggests
that the EcoPC patents potentially are of less value than otherwise comparable patents.
When we look at the number of forward citations received, the set of control patents
accumulated a larger average number of citations than the pledged patents.
Table 5

Mean patent characteristics for 89 Eco-patents and 90 control patents#

Variable
Application year
D (granted)
Grant lag in years*
Family size
Number of claims*
Forward patent cites
Backward patent cites
Non-patent references
Number of applicants
Number of inventors*

Controls
1998.9
0.51
3.93
5.24
23.61
22.67
7.39
2.50
1.10
2.70

Ecopatents
1998.8
0.73
3.74
3.78
14.60
13.22
5.63
1.10
1.04
3.00

Difference
(s.e.)
p-value
-0.10 (0.68) 0.882
0.22 (0.07)
0.002
-0.19 (0.55) 0.725
-1.47 (0.62) 0.018
-9.01 (3.87) 0.023
-9.44 (4.04) 0.021
-1.76 (2.07) 0.397
-1.40 (1.33) 0.294
-0.06 (0.09) 0.553
0.30 (0.28)
0.294

KruskalWallis test
0.01
6.42
1.25
4.54
2.88
2.25
1.74
0.02
0.02
2.12

p-value
0.920
0.011
0.264
0.033
0.090
0.134
0.187
0.903
0.899
0.145

# A few control observations (5 in total) were lost due to missing data.
* The mean is shown for non-missing observations only.
The Kruskal-Wallis test is a rank test for the equality of the two populations.

Table 6 below shows the share of EcoPC and control patents that receive any citations as
well as the average number of citations received (Table A-2 in the appendix shows a
comparison of patent characteristics for patents with non-zero forward citations). As
indicated earlier, compared to Table 6 in Hall and Helmers (2013), there are slightly fewer
equivalents of our EcoPC patents and controls due to missing data and the consolidation at
the APO. The share of patents that have citations has increased, becoming close to 90 per
cent for the equivalence groups, and the average citations per equivalence group has more
than doubled. None of these results are unexpected, given the additional five years of data,
19
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as well as probable improvements in the PATSTAT coverage itself, but also highlights our
much improved ability to assess the question of technology diffusion as a result of the
EcoPC.

Table 6: Citation counts for EcoPC patents and controls

Eco-patents
Controls

Eco-patents
Controls

equivalence
equivalence
all patents
group
all patents
group
all patents
Total
Total patents
Share with citations
citations
237
90
73.0%
85.6%
1343
461
94
57.1%
93.6%
2713
Average citations*
10.5
17.4
13.2
30.8

Average citations**
5.7
14.9
5.9
28.9

Citations are measured as all forward citations in the patent literature between the
application date and April/May 2017, adjusted for citations by equivalent patents in
other jurisdictions.
*Average over patents with nonzero citations.
**Average over all patents

Table 7 and Figure 3 below show the key results of our new analysis. Poisson and negative
binomial models of citations at the patent-level show that EcoPC patents are half as likely
to be cited than the controls (an elasticity of 0.4-0.6), and even less likely after donation,
although this last result is only marginally significant. These regressions control for both
priority year and the citation lag using dummies.
It is well-known that the citation lag distribution for patents has a somewhat smooth
structure, rising at first to a peak at 3-5 years and then declining slowly. We therefore
attempt to improve the precision of our estimates by imposing the Jaffe-Trajtenberg model
of citation diffusion and decline (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1999) rather than using the citation
lag dummies. This model, shown in the final three columns of Table 7, uses a parametric
model for the citation lag that is given by the following equation:

cst = b 0 (1 + deco Deco + dafter Dafter ) f (t ) exp[- b1(1 + b1e Deco )s ][1 - exp( b 2 (1 + b 2e Deco ) s)] + est
Where t is the priority year of the cited patent, s is the citation lag, and cst is the citation rate
(the number of citations at that lag per sample patents available to be cited). f(t) is modeled
20
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as a set of priority year dummies. That is, the unit of observation is the average cites per
patents with a given priority year, citation lag, and patent type (EcoPC patent before and
after or control). Prior experience with this specification suggests that although it is an
appealing model in that it captures both the initial increase in citation due to knowledge
diffusion and the decline due to knowledge age, it is quite difficult to estimate successfully
(Hall et al. 2001). We do it in two ways: (1) nonlinear least squares with a dependent
variable equal to average cites per patent, and (2) Poisson with a dependent variable equal
to the total cites at the given lag to patents with a given priority year. In the latter case we
multiply the right hand side of the model by the number of patents, so the models are
equivalent. The results from the two estimation strategies are similar. Once we impose a
model on the citation lag, the EcoPC patents are cited an average of 25 per cent less than
the controls, and there is no change after donation. The decay (obsolescence) and diffusion
parameters are similar to those obtained by Hall et al. (2001) for the US patent data, with
obsolescence increasing by about 5 per cent per year, and diffusion about 50 per cent.
However, keep in mind that one reason the first is relatively low and the second relatively
high is that there is a secular growth in citations that is not completely captured by the
priority year dummies. That is, this model imposes a fixed citation lag structure on the data
which is then allowed to be higher or lower, depending on priority year and EcoPC status.
Because citations are often added by examiners rather than applicants,28 we also report
results in Appendix Table A-3 and Figure B-1 where we retain only citations made by
applicants. That said, the results are very similar to the ones reported in Table 7 and Figure
3; there is no evidence of increased diffusion of patents after they were pledged to the
EcoPC.

Note that for the purposes of analyzing diffusion, it is preferable to include citations added by examiners
because these citations also indicate that the citing patent builds on the cited prior art where this relationship
was identified by examiners who are commonly experts in the relevant technology areas.
28
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Table 7: Estimation of citation lag models
Model
Dependent variable
Method

Semi-parametric
Cites
Cites
Poisson
Negative binomial

EcoPC patent
EcoPC patent after
donation
Decay parameter
Diffusion parameter
EcoPC decay
Dispersion parameter

Cites/patent
NLLS

Jaffe-Trajtenberg
Cites
Poisson

Cites
Poisson

-0.60 (0.11) *** -0.42 (0.10) *** -0.33 (0.09) *** -0.22 (0.04) *** -0.25 (0.05) ***
-0.35 (0.21)

-0.33 (0.17)

3.21

*

-0.10 (0.18)
-0.01 (0.08)
0.01
0.07 (0.02) *** 0.04 (0.01) *** 0.05
0.49 (0.21) ** 0.76 (0.19) *** 0.64
0.47

(0.08)
(0.01) ***
(0.21) ***
(0.38)

(0.17) ***

Citation lag dummies

yes

yes

no

no

no

Priority year dummies

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

3071
-6,143.0

3071
-3,745.2

518
-845.6

518
12,062.8

518
12068.6

Observations
Log likelihood

Sample: 94 controls and 90 EcoPC patents with priority years between 1992 and 2005 and citing years between
1992 and 2016. The unit of observation in the first two columns is a priority patent-citing year and in the next three
columns a priority year-citing year.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels.

Figure 3
Cites per patent by citing year (as of May 2017)
3.00
Donation
year

2.50

2.00

1.50

1.00

0.50

0.00
1992

1996
Controls

2000
Eco-patents

2004
Entry date

2008
Controls fitted

2012
2016
Eco-pats fitted
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Table 7 and Figure 3 show that there is little change in aggregate citation differences
between EcoPC patents and controls before and after being pledged to the commons,
although EcoPC patents are cited less overall. It is important to remember, however, that
because the pledging firms retain a defensive termination right, there may be continuing
innovation building on these patents that does not result in new patent applications (and
citations). That is, there are limits created on the enforcement of patent rights by the firms
that use the technologies in these patents, which may reduce the benefits of subsequent
patenting, and thus reduce citations to the pledged patent. This issue is related to a broader
problem: our analysis of diffusion only looks for diffusion that leads to follow-on
innovation that is patented. This excludes simple use of pledged patented technologies and
even follow-on innovation if it does not lead to a patent filing. However, in the absence of
any information on the use of pledged patents (see Section 3 above), the forward citation
analysis is the only way to quantitatively assess the impact of the patent pledge on
diffusion.
It is also possible that the nature of the citation changes, in that the technology in the
patents becomes more useful to individuals and non-profit institutions given the absence of
royalty requirements. We investigate this question by looking at the source of the citations
to the EcoPC patents and controls before and after donation. We divide the cites into five
groupings according to their source: self-citations from the firm that owns the pledged
patent, citations from other EcoPC participants, citations from other firms, citations from
individual patentees, and citations from non-profit institutions (universities, hospitals,
public research organizations (PROs), and governments). We then define the before and
after period for each grouping of citations according to the relation between the earliest
priority date for the citing patent and the date the cited patent was donated to the
commons. The results are shown in Table 8. In some cases, sample sizes are fairly small,
but it does appear that self-citation falls relative to all the other categories, with the largest
(percentage) increases in citations by other EcoPC participants and non-profit institutions.
One issue that arises when counting the source of citations is that many patents have
multiple applicants of different types. Given the nonrivalry of knowledge, which implies
that one citer’s use of the knowledge in a patent does not depend on use by another citer, it
might be appropriate to simply count all the applicant-citations as citations as we did in the
first panel of Table 8. Nevertheless we also show a weighted version of the table in the
second panel where the weights are proportional to the inverse of the number of applicants
on the citing patent.29 Although the distribution of cites changes dramatically when we
weight, due to the tendency of individuals to share in applications, the qualitative
conclusions with respect to the post-commons citing behavior are the same.
We removed individual inventor-applicants where there was also a firm applicant before computing the
weights, on the grounds that these applicants usually are employed by the firm in question.
29
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As described earlier, in order to validate our quantitative results, we asked the inventors of
patents that cited an EcoPC patent after they were pledged (a) whether they were aware of
the citation (we exclude citations added by examiners), (b) if they were aware of the
citation, whether they knew that the cited patent was part of the EcoPC, and (c) if they had
answered (a) and (b) affirmatively, whether the fact that the EcoPC patent was available for
use royalty-free played any role in their decision to rely on it as prior art. As explained in
Section 4 above, we obtained valid responses from 10 inventors; 50% indicated that they
were aware of the citation, but none of them was aware that the cited patent was part of
the EcoPC. While the sample of inventors is obviously very small, it nevertheless confirms
our quantitative results: the pledge of a patent to the EcoPC was ineffective in spurring the
diffusion of the patented invention. In fact, the responses from the inventors also confirm
the results of our interviews with company representatives as they suggest that inventors
were unware of the EcoPC even when they relied on patents that were part of the EcoPC as
prior art.
Table 8

Citation to the eco-patents by citer type
Unweighted
Before
After
Share
Firm
donation donation
before
Self-citation
141
24
9.9%
Other eco-patent firm
11
13
0.8%
Other firm
645
248
45.1%
Individual
589
219
41.2%
Institution
43
22
3.0%
Total
1429
526

Share
after
4.6%
2.5%
47.1%
41.6%
4.2%

Weighted
Before
After
Share
donation donation
before
127.1
12.9
12.3%
8.0
7.3
0.8%
627.5
229.8
60.5%
243.0
71.7
23.4%
31.7
12.4
3.1%
1037.3
334.1

Share
after
3.9%
2.2%
68.8%
21.5%
3.7%

These totals are for cites to the contributed eco-patents only.
Weighted cites are weighted according to the number of applicants.

6. Conclusion
The results of our empirical analysis suggest fairly strongly that the technologies covered
by the contributed patents did not in fact attract a lot of interest by third parties, even
before contribution to the commons. As a result, pledging these patents to the commons
did not affect the interest of third parties in their underlying technologies and hence the
commons did not promote their use and diffusion.
One of the reasons for the EcoPC’s lack of effectiveness is the fact that it was conceived and
implemented by the suppliers of technology as a volunteer effort without consulting the
demand side (potential users of these patents/technologies). As such, the EcoPC was
constructed in such a way that it was not easy for potential users to understand how the
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available technologies could be used. It simply offered a passive web site with patent
listings, rather than suggestions how these technologies could be utilized, either separately
or together.30 Our results suggest that effective technology diffusion requires more than
patent non-assertion, especially in the developing world. Technical assistance and knowhow are essential for implementing environmental technologies to an even greater degree
than for software or pharma (Barton et al., 2002; McManis and Contreras, 2014) and patent
disclosures alone are seldom sufficient to enable someone to implement a technology
effectively (see Ouellette, 2012 for the results of a survey of patent readers).
Likewise, there was little or no coordination among EcoPC contributors regarding the
technologies covered by the patents they were contributing. As discussed in Hall and
Helmers (2013), the pledged patents appeared to largely protect different technologies.
Hence, the implementation of a given technology might not have been possible using only
pledged patents (i.e., any of the covered technologies could require the use of additional
patents not contributed to the commons). As a result, synergies that could have emerged
from the contribution of multiple patents covering selected technologies did not emerge.
Perhaps the most cogent critique of the EcoPC was its lack of tracking of patent utilization.
Without knowledge of how/whether patents were being utilized, companies could not
justify expending further effort on the activity. Moreover, even the public relations benefit
of belonging to the EcoPC waned after the initial contributions, given that there were no
‘success stories’ to promote. More generally, the lack of information on usage meant that it
was very difficult to gauge the success of the initiative and to make adjustments to its
structure and management to improve its performance. Finally, the lack of demonstrable
results from the project eroded the potential public relations benefits that member firms
may have hoped to achieve from participation in the EcoPC.
This lack of usage tracking underscores another weakness of the EcoPC, especially when
compared to more successful pledge communities: the lack of dedicated administrative and
managerial resources devoted to expanding and promoting the commons. While EcoPC was
housed within well-established organizations such as WBCSD and ELI, these organizations
received no additional compensation for managing EcoPC and appear to have taken on this
role as an accommodation to a significant member (IBM). As the example of DPL has shown
(Contreras 2018), the lack of dedicated managerial and promotional resources can
contribute to the failure of a pledge community to gain significant traction in the
marketplace.

A similar supply-side model for patents can be found in the IPXI Exchange, an attempt to offer unitized
licenses of pooled patents essential to certain industry standards. Like the EcoPC, IPXI failed to achieve
significant take-up and eventually discontinued its operations (see Contreras, 2016).
30
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The experience of the EcoPC, even though it did not realize its ambitious goals, has helped
to advance our understanding of how patent commons can work and fail to work. As such,
the EcoPC has made an undeniable contribution to the study of patent commons and
pledges.
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Online appendix (not for publication)
Appendix A: Additional tables
Table A-1

Mean patent characteristics for 236 Eco-patents and 454 control patents

Variable
Application year
D (granted)
Grant lag in years*
Family size
Number of claims*
Forward patent cites
Backward patent cites
Non-patent references
Number of applicants
Number of inventors*

Controls
1998.8
0.51
4.63
8.83
23.05
27.24
5.96
1.32
1.13
2.83

Ecopatents Difference (s.e.)
1997.8
-1.02 (0.39)
0.68
0.17 (0.04)
4.14
-0.49 (0.30)
5.96
-2.87 (0.40)
14.90
-8.15 (2.41)
15.92
-11.32 (2.28)
4.31
-1.65 (1.19)
0.66
-0.66 (0.44)
1.11
-0.02 (0.07)
2.91
0.07 (0.17)

p-value
0.009
0.000
0.103
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.167
0.136
0.765
0.675

KruskalWallis test
5.65
13.30
4.32
43.19
9.63
17.28
8.49
0.10
0.18
3.61

p-value
0.017
0.000
0.038
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.004
0.758
0.673
0.057

* The mean is shown for non-missing observations only.
The Kruskal-Wallis test is a rank test for the equality of the two populations.

Table A-2

Patents with nonzero forward cites only (437 controls; 218 eco-patents)
Variable
Application year
D (granted)
Grant lag in years*
Family size
Number of claims*
Forward patent cites
Backward patent cites
Non-patent references
Number of applicants
Number of inventors*

Controls
1998.7
0.51
4.60
9.03
23.23
28.30
6.11
1.36
1.12
2.82

Ecopatents Difference (s.e.)
1997.6
-1.14 (0.40)
0.70
0.19 (0.04)
4.14
-0.46 (0.31)
6.26
-2.78 (0.41)
15.11
-8.11 (2.45)
17.23
-11.07 (0.38)
4.57
-1.53 (1.26)
0.70
-0.66 (0.47)
1.11
-0.01 (0.07)
2.97
0.14 (0.18)

p-value
0.004
0.000
0.131
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.223
0.161
0.844
0.425

KruskalWallis test
7.13
15.23
3.29
37.56
9.17
13.05
9.23
0.19
0.21
6.36

* The mean is shown for non-missing observations only.
The Kruskal-Wallis test is a rank test for the equality of the two populations.
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p-value
0.008
0.000
0.070
0.000
0.003
0.000
0.002
0.665
0.649
0.012

Table A-3
Applicant cites only
Model
Dependent Variable
Method

Semi-parametric
Cites
Cites
Poisson
Negative Binomial

EcoPC Patent
EcoPC Patent after
donation
Decay Parameter
Diffusion Parameter
EcoPC Decay
Dispersion Parameter

Cites/Patent
NLLS

Jaffe-Trajtenberg
Cites
Poisson

-0.87 (0.15) *** -0.65 (0.13) *** -0.65 (0.05) *** -0.45 (0.08) ***
-0.64 (0.29) **

-0.51 (0.22) **

4.47

-0.05
0.13

(0.68)
(0.28)

-0.09
0.10

Cites
Poisson
NOT
IDENTIFIED

(0.02) ***
(0.01) ***

(0.35) ***

Citations Lag Dummies

yes

yes

no

no

no

Priority Year Dummies

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

3046
-3,422.0

3046
-2,212.4

512
-588.6

512
3,566.6

512

Observations
Log Likelihood

Sample: 94 controls and 90 EcoPC patents with priority years between 1992 and 2005 and citing years between 1994
and 2016. The unit of observation in the first two columns is a priority patent-citing year and in the next three columns
a priority year-citing year.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Significant at the one per cent (***), five per cent (**) and 10 per cent (*) levels.
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Appendix B: Additional figure
Figure B-1
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